Remember the blockade?: Gulf Geopolitics and the 2022 World Cup
10th Jan 2023 by Javier Bordón
Not much time has passed since the period when the viability of Qatar’s World Cup was in question due to virulent differences with its ‘brotherly’ neighbours. Football has often been the showcase for evolving political relations in the Gulf. The fact that Gianni Infantino, the president of FIFA, was present during the signing ceremony of the 2020 al-Ula agreement that formally ended the crisis exposes the extent of the interlocking between sports and geopolitics. The former is often seen as a mitigating factor for the latter but, during the four-year crisis, it can be said the effect was actually the opposite. On the eve of the World Cup, however, football recovered its role as an arena for the display of cooperation and solidarity.
As the implications of al-Ula started to emerge, Newcastle’s purchase went through, beoutQ went offline, and beIN resumed broadcasting in Saudi Arabia, amidst fresh reports suggesting the Kingdom may have an interest in buying stakes in the media competitor. Saudi Arabia and the UAE arranged visas and shuttle flights to fans attending the tournament, in a clear show of coordination with Qatar that benefits their tourism and hospitality sectors. The Kingdom also offered Umrah visas to visit Mecca, creating an interesting combination between sports entertainment and religious practice.
The delineation of an expanded Qatari Flight Information Region (FIR) with the consent of the so-called Arab Quartet symbolises a U-turn when compared to the four-year hiatus, during which the main underlying causes of friction passed by curtailing Qatar’s sovereignty. It may be read as a de-escalatory sign on the heels of reciprocal accusations between Doha and Manama over alleged violations of their respective airspace and territorial waters, where the al-Hawar Islands’ dispute still retains appeal to bring the past into contemporary grievances. Saudi Arabia seems more eager to build its relationship with Qatar than the UAE or Bahrain, who have yet to announce new ambassadors, despite having restored travel and trade links. Perhaps it is equally telling that Saudi Arabia was the only blockader amongst the foreign states providing security forces to the tournament.
As in other editions, the 2022 World Cup has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity and positive messaging. And yet contrary to other editions, the scale of potential breakthroughs across the region that the month-long tournament leaves behind is quite astonishing, going beyond the Saudi-Qatari signs of advanced rapprochement, as the Saudi Crown Prince wore the Qatar Football Association’s scarf and the Qatari Emir draped the Saudi national flag around his neck. For the first time since the blockade’s end, the President of the UAE, Muhammad bin Zayed, paid an express visit to Doha before returning to Abu Dhabi to meet Israel’s president. Bin Zayed’s words echoed what many regional fans have enthusiastically shared on traditional and social media: hosting the World Cup is a success ‘for all Arabs’. The event’s opening ceremony equally saw the first-ever meeting between the Turkish and Egyptian Presidents since the latter came to power through a military coup almost a decade ago. It is not entirely clear whether the ‘spectre’ of the Muslim Brotherhood has been completely left aside, or if there is real progress towards a common -and exploitable- understanding in the Eastern Mediterranean. Nonetheless, Erdogan hinted an official meeting with al-Sisi is on the horizon, and in passing left the door open for a similar encounter with Syria’s al-Assad. For Muhammad bin Salman, the World Cup offered another platform for situating Saudi Arabia, with him at the helm, at the centre of the global stage. His presence at the opening ceremony occurred just days after the US government confirmed his immunity in his capacity as Prime Minister and two weeks before China’s President, Xi Jinping, paid a three-day visit to the Kingdom, where both leaders agreed to upgrade the bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership.
In the Gulf, aggressive securitised rhetoric at the highest levels of policymaking has receded in favour of statements emphasising economic opportunity. Competition and distrust do continue, albeit in less explosive ways. The al-Ula declaration pledged advancing towards “a unified foreign policy for member states.” The means and structures of opportunity have changed, but questions and divergent aspirations over the regional order remain on the agenda.
Image by flatart on FreePik. https://www.freepik.com/free-v...